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Abstract
The Air Force executes its mission primarily through the use of fixed-wing
aircrafts. Maintaining these aircrafts represents approximately one-third of annual
Operating and Support costs; which in turn, make up the majority of Life Cycle Costs.
The current approach to estimating aircraft maintenance costs does not take into
consideration programmatic data available in the Air Force Total Ownership Cost
(AFTOC) database. The four maintenance cost subcategories researched in this thesis are
Consumable Materials and Repair Parts, Depot Level Repairables (DLRs), Depot
Maintenance, and Contractor Logistic Support. Each of these cost categories must first
be standardized to be able to compare costs across years and across airframes. Through
regression, this research attempts to determine cost drivers within maintenance cost
subcategories and build predictive models for annual maintenance costs. Upon validating
the models, they did not prove to provide better estimates than the currently used method
of applying a 2% increase factor. They do however, provide a framework for further
research into possible cost driving variables maintained outside of AFTOC.
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I. Introduction
Background
Given the Air Force’s mission and its push for air superiority, the service’s operations are
centered around aircraft, specifically those with fixed wings. A current hot issue in the news and
on the mind of Congress is the rising price tag of the F-35. But, the costs don’t stop once an
aircraft is ordered; that is merely the beginning. Considering the entire acquisition lifecycle of
major weapon systems, the Operation & Support (O&S) phase is the costliest and comprises on
average 72% of a program’s overall cost (Defense Systems Management College, 1997). Of a
program’s O&S costs, roughly a third of is used by maintenance (OSD, 2014). Aircraft
maintenance costs are a considerably large portion of annual costs and getting these estimates
more accurate will both support program managers and enhance the mission of the Air Force.
Research Approach
The Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) Management Information System tracks
annual aircraft maintenance costs for the Air Force. The database was developed in response to
a call by the Secretary of Defense in the year 2000, to provide more visibility into the life cycle
cost of weapon systems (Brown, 2010). In addition to cost data, the system extracts information
from a number of sources to also include manning numbers, flying hours, inventory data and
other aircraft specific programmatic information. As quoted by SAF/FM in the system’s
introduction document found on AFTOC’s homepage, “The AFTOC system, when fully
implemented, will be the authoritative source across the Air Force for financial, acquisition, and
logistics information.” Data in AFTOC dates back to 1996 for some aircraft and includes recent
data from the present year, 2017.
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The Air Force Cost and Performance (AFCAP) tool is a user-friendly macros-enabled
pivot table tool built in Microsoft Excel that pulls data directly from AFTOC and other databases
and allows for easy extraction, manipulation and conversion of all O&S costs at varying levels of
detail. Consistent with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) O&S Cost Estimating
Guide, the O&S Maintenance cost category is divided into subcategories as follows: 3.1)
Consumable Materials and Repair Parts, 3.2) Depot Level Repairables (DLRs), 3.3) Intermediate
Maintenance (external to Unit-Level), 3.4) Depot Maintenance, and 3.5) Other Maintenance.
Within each of the subcategories follows more detailed distinction. As with any database,
AFTOC and the AFCAP tool have their limitations and so it is necessary to build a custom
dataset to accommodate the analysis performed for this research.
With a dataset that has been standardized across aircraft and fiscal year to adjust for the
effects of inflation and usage, the program JMP Pro 12.0.1 is used to perform regression analysis
on the annual aircraft maintenance costs in hopes of developing predictive models.
Programmatic variables available in the AFCAP tool are tested to determine if any of the
currently tracked variables are predictive of annual aircraft maintenance costs. Determining the
cost drivers provides insight into what factors have the ability to influence the overall annual
maintenance cost. Cost estimating models are developed at the maintenance cost subcategories
as detailed in the O&S Cost Estimating Guide. Finally, a subset of the data will be set aside to
perform model validations.
Ultimately, the coefficients of any predictive models are not set in time. As aircrafts age,
as technology get more advanced, as more data becomes available, models will need updating,
but the overall process is repeatable to accommodate changes in data. The aforementioned
process of building regression models differs from the current approach to estimating annual
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maintenance costs. To estimate an annual maintenance cost, the previous year’s maintenance
cost is adjusted according to the most current Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) inflation
table and adding an additional 2% for escalation (Ronning, 2017). The current process for
estimating aircraft maintenance costs does not take into account any programmatic or aircraft
mission specific data. This thesis works towards determining cost estimating relationships and
cost estimating models to improve upon the accuracy of annual fixed-wing aircraft maintenance
cost estimates.
Research Questions
1. What variables maintained within AFTOC are major cost drivers of annual fixed-wing
aircraft maintenance costs?
2. What predictive models for aircraft maintenance costs can be derived from determined
cost drivers?
3. At what aircraft classification level (M/D/S) can these models be developed for
maximum accuracy?
Summary
The current technique for estimating Air Force aircraft maintenance costs utilizes overly
general and simplistic analogies. The same index is applied without any regard to other factors
specific to the aircraft. The Air Force owns and maintains a plethora of data in AFTOC but it’s
possible that this data is not being used to its fullest capabilities. AFTOC extracts both cost and
programmatic data from various data sources as a way to increase the visibility of the total cost
of a weapon system and ultimately make the decision maker more informed. Regression
analysis is useful in determining the major cost drivers of annual maintenance costs that can be
used to build a predictive model to create more accurate estimates.
3

Developing cost estimates for large weapon systems is a complex undertaking given the
amount of information and variation present in so many of the variables. Annual cost estimates
are used to help determine annual budgets. Thus, estimates that grossly over or under estimate
the actual cost have impacts on other Air Force programs. Improving O&S cost estimates has
been a new focus since the enactment of the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act in 2009.
While lots of time and effort was placed into developing cost estimates in the early phases of the
acquisition life cycle, O&S estimates were comparatively an afterthought despite these costs
ranging from roughly 60% - 80% of the total life cycle cost.
Chapter One of this thesis introduces the problem at hand and sheds light on the scope of
this work. Chapter Two explores previous work in this field and educates the reader on the
previous lack of focus on O&S costs but indicates the desire and importance of future research
on the topic. This chapter also reviews potential techniques to develop predictive equations for
aircraft O&S maintenance costs. Chapter Three details the systems used to retrieve data, the
techniques used to transform the data and the methodology implemented to answer the research
questions and develop predictive equations. Chapter Four acts as a standalone article that briefly
recounts the task at hand and delves into the analyses and the results from techniques described
in the previous chapter. Lastly, Chapter Five speaks to the implications for the research findings,
provides potential follow on topics and summarizes the entirety of this thesis.
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II. Literature Review
Chapter Overview
The review of previous work and studies accomplished as presented are meant to guide
the reader to an understanding of the importance of providing better estimations for aircraft
maintenance costs. Aircraft maintenance costs are not stand alone cost figures but rather are a
fraction of weapon systems’ costs that are, at the highest level, all-encompassing dollar figures.
The “cost” for the newest joint strike fighter, the F-35, has been a hot issue in current news. It is
important to understand what the definition of “cost” encompasses in the numbers that are being
reported. As reported by Mizokami (2017) the overall estimated cost for the requested 2,456 F35 aircrafts is $406.5 billion. This cost includes research and development, testing and
evaluation, the actual purchase of the aircrafts, and building new facilities to support the
aircrafts.
The dollar figure currently associated with the F-35, however, includes none of the costs
that will be required for operating and maintaining this fleet of aircraft for its useable lifetime. A
short introduction to the definition and components of a weapon system’s total life cycle cost
will provide the basis of knowledge to then begin to breakdown costs at more specific levels for
further in-depth and detailed analysis. Within the life cycle cost structure lies specific cost
categories that make up the operating and support costs of a weapon system. It is in the
operating and support cost category that we drill down to the lower levels of cost to include
maintenance costs, which again contain further subcategories of costs. An understanding of the
intricacies of these maintenance cost subcategories is necessary before attempting to determine
estimates and relationships between annual aircraft maintenance costs and potential explanatory
variables.
5

Life Cycle Costs
The life cycle cost (LCC) of a system accounts for an all-inclusive and exhaustive dollar
amount the government incurs from “cradle to grave” or from the initial concept of a system to
the end of a system being phased out. In regard to defense systems, the LCC is also referred to
as the Total Ownership Cost (Life-Cycle Costs, 2008). The Government Accountability Office
(GAO) Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide identifies the four major cost categories that
make up the LCC: research and development costs, procurement and investment costs,
operations and support costs, and disposal costs (2009).
The research and development phase includes costs associated with a system’s design,
development, evaluation, test equipment and startup. Procurement and investment costs are
comprised of production, deployment, and initial and repair parts for the prime system. All
direct and indirect costs incurred from the use and maintenance of the system falls under the
operating and support (O&S) costs. This includes subcategories such as manpower, fuel, repairs
and sustaining engineering. Finally, disposal costs encompass demilitarization and the
breakdown of a system after its useful life (GAO, 2009). While all services use this cost
category structure, there are slight differences in where some costs are placed.
The LCC structure of four cost categories is used to develop an estimate, the Life Cycle
Cost Estimate (LCCE). This LCCE is important not only for tracking the progress of a system
but also for developing budgets. Additionally, an LCCE might be used by decision makers to
determine if it is an appropriate expenditure and fiscally responsible to taxpayers to continue
along the acquisition process of a system. The importance of getting an LCCE as accurate as
possible is clear; however, as indicated by Ryan, Jacques, Colombi and Schubert (2009) there is
often very little confidence placed in these estimates.

6

Figure 1. Relationship Between Cost and Life Cycle Phase
The disposal cost of a system can almost be considered negligible when compared to the
first three cost categories. Of these remaining categories, both research and procurement costs
can be considered acquisition costs; money that is used to physically acquire the weapon system.
Thus, a system’s LCC can be described as the sum of the acquisition costs and the remaining
category of O&S costs. The acquisition phase of a system is relatively shorter and under tighter
control as compared to the O&S phase of a system; however, it is often the decisions made early
in the system’s life cycle that drive the total LCC (Defense Standardization Program Office,
2016). Figure 1 illustrates this relationship of LCC spent and committed along the timeline of
the acquisition phases of a system (Defense Standardization Program Office, 2016). Not until
recently has the Department of Defense (DoD) placed more emphasis on improving life cycle
cost estimates and according to Ryan et al. (2009), a good LCC estimate must first stem from
robust knowledge on the accuracy of a program’s O&S costs.
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Operating & Support Costs
As previously mentioned, operating and support costs encompass the amount of money
that the government spends to use and maintain a weapon system over its lifespan. Operating
and support cost estimates are not a one-time requirement but rather, are useful along various
stages on the acquisition process and the total life cycle. Initial estimates may be used in tradeoff studies, analysis of alternative decisions, and affordability analysis. As a program matures,
the O&S costs estimate should be updated with newly available data and actuals from previous
fiscal years. This is necessary as both a tracking tool for past performance and as a basis for
future estimates, which are then translated into annual budgets. Developing an appropriate O&S
cost estimate, according to the O&S Cost-Estimating Guide, consists of the following top-level
approach: 1) develop an analytical approach based on requirements and with a documented set of
assumptions, 2) collect and validate data, 3) develop an estimating model, 4) identify risk areas,
5) estimate costs, 6) conduct sensitivity analysis, and 7) continually document results so
estimates can be replicated (OSD, 2014). This arduous and meticulous process was once thought
of as a near afterthought along the life cycle of a system (Jones, White, Ryan & Ritschel, 2014).
It was not until recently that O&S cost estimates became an important piece of the equation
(United States Congress, 2009).
The recent shift of focus to O&S costs means that there are relatively few published
works that focus on purely O&S costs. The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act
(WSARA) of 2009 formally brought a new set of mandated requirements along with a shift in
emphasis to O&S estimates. The WSARA highlights the necessity for analyzing, reporting, and
attempting to reduce operating and support costs for major weapon systems throughout the
Department of Defense. Section 304 of the Act lays out the expectation for the Comptroller
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General to review and report on O&S costs. In addition to monitoring actual O&S costs and
rates of growth in O&S costs for all major weapon systems (United States Congress, 2009), this
publication requires that active measures are taken by the DoD to reduce O&S costs. This set of
requirements and others detailed in the WSARA have led to an increase into the time and
resources spent on not just collecting O&S cost data but also on using this newly available data
to estimate these same costs for the future.
While the DoD has taken a step in the right direction with WSARA, it may still yet be
some time before its benefits are evident. In addition to the requirement of valid data of actual
costs and predicted costs, enough time has to lapse for a large number of programs to have this
data and a methodology needs to be established to be able to adequately perform quantitative
analysis. Ryan et al. (2009) proposes one possible methodology in an attempt to measure the
accuracy of O&S estimates against actuals. He suggests comparing annual unitized O&S costs
(converted to a standard base year) for actuals and estimates but recognizes a few concerns with
this approach (Ryan et al., 2009). One such concern addressed by the GAO (2010) is that
significant program changes, such as a decrease in flying hours or total number of aircraft, often
occur after initial production costs estimates are developed. This makes it difficult to perform
comparisons between actual and estimated costs and it brings to light the unfortunate reality that
O&S estimates are not updated with information from the most recent actuals as often as they
should.
The Operating and Support Cost-Estimating Guide identifies the same four LCC
categories as previously explained and provides a visual representation of the relative magnitude
of each category (OSD, 2014). Figure 2, although merely an illustrative rather than a
quantitative graphic, clearly depicts the sizeable difference in the portion of O&S costs as
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compared to the other three LCC cost categories. From this graphic, it can be stated that O&S
costs account for the majority of a system’s LCC (OSD, 2014). Additionally, the guide does
indicate that the percentage of O&S costs varies based on the type of system. Jones, et al. (2014)
also indicate the previous statement holds true in their analysis. It breaks out major weapon
systems into seven categories: fixed wing aircraft, rotary wing aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAV), ground systems, surface ships, submarines, and space systems. For all categories except
space systems, the average percentage of O&S costs ranges from 55% in the UAVs category to
69% for surface ships (OSD, 2014). For fixed wing aircraft, the average is 63%. Pie charts of
each type of system and the percentage breakout of each cost category can be seen in Appendix
A. Besides indicating that these percentages were derived from recent Selected Acquisition
Report (SAR) data, there is no further indication of how these numbers where derived.

Figure 2. Illustrative Depiction of Life Cycle Costs
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In an attempt to determine an appropriate percentage to represent the average percentage
of O&S costs to the total LCC, Jones et al. (2014) challenge the ratio of 70% O&S costs that has
become a “rule-of-thumb” in the cost community. Most interesting to note, is that Jones was
unable to determine a source that indicated when or why 70% became the standard percentage
used when describing O&S costs in relationship to LCCs. Jones et al. (2014) looked at a number
of sources that assessed the portion of the LCC that is comprised of O&S costs and a summary of
his findings can be found in Appendix B. Using both defense related and non-military sources,
the O&S percentage ranged from a low of 24% to a high of 90%. His analysis indicated that it’s
inappropriate to use a standard across all weapon systems and his results show quite a variance
based on system type (Jones et al., 2014).
Table 1. Summary of O&S Percentage of LCC from Jones et al. (2014) Analysis
System
Ships
Ships – No Submarines
Fighter Aircraft
Cargo/Tanker/Bomber Aircraft
C/T/B – No KC-135R
Missiles
Rotary Wing Aircraft
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Electronic Equipment
Tilt Rotor Aircraft

Mean
48.21%
53.26%
52.99%
65.15%
59.94%
8.35%
70.73%
71.56%
15.53%
65.03%

Median
51.12%
51.46%
51.46%
61.73%
59.55%
6.56%
70.13%
71.56%
15.53%
65.03%

His initial analysis into a more accurate representation of O&S costs sets up further
analysis to create a better model to more accurately predict O&S costs. His findings resulted in a
mean O&S percentage of 49.88% and a median of 54.09% of all systems combined together
(Jones et al., 2014). His results, broken out by system type, can be seen in Table 1. As only two
of the total ten categories have a mean or median near 70%, it’s clear that the 70% typically used
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and quoted by the acquisition community is inappropriate and typically an over estimation.
Jones et al. (2014) suggest considering the variability in weapon systems due to things like
mission capabilities, size and acquisition techniques.
While it’s true that the WSARA sparked the increase into research on O&S costs, there
have still yet been a surprisingly small number of studies that have been performed on the topic.
One such study by Hildebrandt and Sze (1990) analyzed fixed-wing aircraft O&S cost data
available in the Visibility and Management of Operation & Support Cost (VAMSOC) system
from 1981-1986. This is a dated study, thirty-plus years, but the cost relationships that were
discovered in this study may prove to still hold true in some form with the data that is currently
available. At a bare minimum, they can provide insight in cost relationships for aircraft O&S
data. Many things have changed in thirty years so it is unlikely that magnitudes of relationships
are equivalent or similar but the possibility that this cost estimating approach is still applicable.
Hildebrandt and Sze (1990) stated the following in the report summary:
In an environment of declining defense budgets, obtaining the appropriate balance
among the components of U.S. military posture—force structure, modernization,
readiness, and sustainability—will be extremely challenging and require careful
analysis of the cost reduction alternatives. (p. v)
Had the reader been oblivious to the date of this study, this statement could easily be
mistaken for a description of recent fiscal concerns. If researchers thirty years ago felt budget
constraints and recognized the importance of getting O&S estimates correct initially, their
findings may be relevant to current cost concerns. Using a log-linear regression approach to
predict an aircraft’s O&S costs, the researchers were able to determine relationships among
aircraft O&S costs, flyaway costs, total aircraft and design age (Hildebrandt & Sze, 1990).
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Although Hildebrandt and Sze (1990) used a relatively small sample of data
(approximately four hundred observations of fixed wing aircraft from six years of data) the
researchers determined cost estimating relationships with strong explanatory results but did not
test prediction accuracies. That is, no analysis was performed on the equations’ ability to use
those relationships to closely predict future O&S costs. Multiple models made use of the
following variables: Fighter/Attack, Cargo, MDS year, Flying Hours, Number of Aircraft,
Flyaway cost, and MD age. Bottom-line numbers of their research showed that assuming all
other things equal, a one-year increase of an aircraft will bring an approximate 1.7% increase to
the total O&S costs. Limitations from this analysis include the age of the data, the tight-knit
group of aircraft, and an unknown quantitative factor in how technology has advanced since the
eighties.
Just as life cycle costs can be broken up into categories, operating and support costs can
also be further subdivided into like cost categories as seen in Table 2 (OSD, 2014) along with
their respective average percentage. Unit-Level Manpower includes costs of the operator,
maintenance, and support manpower that is typically based on personnel grades and skill
categories of active and reserve military, government civilians and contractors. Unit Operations
costs are comprised of operating material and support services for use in support of the primary
system. This can include materials such as electricity and munitions and temporary duty or
travel costs incurred by the unit. Maintenance costs include both parts and labor that are
required to keep the primary system operational. Sustaining support costs are composed of costs
incurred for system specific trainings and other support functions not already included in
previous categories. Continuing System Improvement costs include modifications and upgrades
to the system and lastly Indirect Support encompasses any costs that cannot be tied directly to the
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unit or the personnel that utilize the primary system (OSD, 2014). More detailed descriptions of
each of these cost categories can be found in the current O&S Cost Estimating Guide.
Table 2. Aircraft Cost Category Breakdown
Aircraft Cost Category
1.0 Unit-Level Manpower
2.0 Unit Operations
3.0 Maintenance
4.0 Sustaining Support
5.0 Continuing System Improvement
6.0 Indirect Support

%
30.8%
21.4%
32.7%
1.4%
9.1%
4.6%

Maintenance Costs
As evident from Table 2, maintenance costs comprise roughly one-third of aircraft O&S
costs and represents the largest cost category. Estimating annual maintenance costs for an
aircraft might initially seem like a small portion of the budget or LCCE but when considering
annual maintenance costs for all aircraft owned and operated by the United States Air Force over
the entire life of those aircraft, one begins to realize that aircraft maintenance cost can become a
sizeable amount of money quickly. Keep in mind maintenance costs constitute roughly 30% of
O&S costs (OSD, 2014) which in turn are approximately 72% of life cycle costs (Defense
Systems Management College, 1997).
Recent estimates as reported to the public have indicated that the most current F-35
estimate for long term operations and support sits at $1.1 trillion if the aircraft is flown until the
projected 2070 (Capaccio, 2017). One such reason for such a high O&S cost is because just four
years into their service life, F-35 aircrafts are anticipated to need approximately 50 maintenance
man-hours per flying hour; that is about three times more maintenance man-hours than the
majority of the fighter aircraft flown by Western air forces (Briganti, 2016). If aircraft
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maintenance is such a large portion of defense spending, then it is imperative to get the cost
estimates as close to accurate as possible.
Breaking down the cost categories from Table 2 once more, we see that within O&S
maintenance costs, there are 5 subcategories: 3.1) Consumable Materials and Repair Parts, 3.2)
Depot Level Repairables (DLRs), 3.3) Intermediate Maintenance (External to Unit-Level), 3.4)
Depot Maintenance, and 3.5) Other Maintenance. There are also three additional categories, all
related to contractor support, that the Air Force tracks within AFTOC: 3.6) Interim Contractor
Support, 3.7) Contractor Logistic Support, and 3.8) Other Contractor Support. There is little
insight into the specifics of these categories through AFTOC as the data in these categories
simply tracks an annual cost.
Consumable Materials and Repair Parts include the cost of items used to support
maintenance of the primary system. These costs include not only the item but also
transportation, storage, and overhead costs. DLR costs are those that the unit incurs when the
system is repaired at a depot, which again includes the cost of the part, transportation, storage,
direct labor, and overhead. Intermediate Maintenance consists of costs that are incurred at
intermediate maintenance locations and could be for materials, parts, or labor. Depot
Maintenance consists of costs for labor and materials when major overhauls are performed on the
primary system. These overhaul activities are often based on schedules established to ensure
proper and safe operations, similar to that of a 100,000-mile maintenance check-up on a car.
Lastly, the Other Maintenance category is used for any maintenance cost that is not already
captured by a previous cost category (OSD, 2014).
Maintenance costs across all airframes are most often standardized for comparison
purposes by flying hours. This makes logical sense because an aircraft that is flown more will
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naturally need more maintenance. Rather, the amount of maintenance necessary for an aircraft is
a product of how much it is flown. The only subcategory in which flying hours are not an
entirely logical standardizer is Depot Maintenance because as mentioned, maintenance
operations performed in this category are often scheduled occurrences. However, for
consistency and understanding purposes flying hours is still used to standardize this cost
category. Accounting for flying hours per aircraft and otherwise standardizing maintenance cost
data allows for more thorough analysis of what factor affect these costs. Knowledge on the cost
drivers can then be applied to the cost estimating process.
Albeit a dated study, Marks and Hess (1981) explored cost estimating relationships for
five different subcategories of specifically aircraft depot maintenance costs. While their analysis
is one level deeper into the maintenance category than the analysis of this study and their results
were less than favorable, their multiple regression technique and some explanatory variables
provide a backbone. Their analysis can be scrutinized for having a rather small sample size as
they used aircraft depot maintenance cost and programmatic data spanning only three fiscal years
from 1975 through 1977. Marks and Hess (1981) also indicated that the focus of their study was
to study estimating relationships for aircraft depot maintenance costs and attempt to develop
accurate estimates for aircraft approaching the acquisition Milestone B and not for determining
annual budgets.
Factors that Marks and Hess (1981) showed to be influential on depot maintenance cost
include aircraft age, environment in which the aircraft is operated, aircraft mission and whether
the aircraft is flown by active duty flyers or reservists and national guard members. Marks and
Hess (1981) used a logarithmic form because it allows for the assumption that a normal
distribution of error will lead to predictive equations with constant percentage error. Their
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results did not produce one single equation, but rather a series of equations for each subcategory
of depot maintenance activity where one equation over another may be more applicable or
appropriate given certain aircraft or maintenance parameters. Similarly, Ronning (2017)
challenged the current aircraft O&S maintenance cost estimating techniques and attempted to
develop predictive equations. However, the results all had large standard deviation values and
large Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores. His results indicated that there were several
variables that exhibited multicollinearity and it seems that more standardization of the data is
necessary to achieve equations that are more adequately predictive (Ronning, 2017). This thesis
works to improve upon the groundwork laid out by Ronning.
Summary
To realize the magnitude of aircraft O&S maintenance cost, it is first imperative to trace
those costs back up to the life cycle cost structure. Operating and supports costs are clearly the
largest portion of LCCs, and similarly, maintenance costs are the largest portion of O&S aircraft
costs. Focusing attention on improving estimates in this O&S cost category has the potential to
have a large impact on annual budgets. Additionally, the WSARA of 2009 has called for an
increased emphasis on not only lowing O&S costs but also creating better estimate techniques
and models. Having an understanding for the structure of how aircraft maintenance costs are
captured and what drives each maintenance cost category provides an opportunity to better
estimate these costs. Chapter Three discusses details of the available aircraft O&S maintenance
cost data and the methodology used to create corresponding cost estimating relationships and
estimating models.
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III. Methodology and Results
Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed approach to building a suitable
database and lay out the steps necessary to perform analysis and build models that can predict
annual fixed-wing maintenance costs in the established subcategories. Raw data is inspected and
exclusion criteria is established to ensure that the resulting database is thorough and robust
enough for analysis. The specific dependent and independent variables are outlined and assessed
for appropriateness of potential inclusion. Because the data is from multiple years and multiple
airframes, it is necessary to standardize the data to be able to appropriately compare values
against each other. With cleaned and standardized data, a stepwise regression approach is
applied to create predictive models, which are then assessed for fit and model assumptions.
Results and implications from these models are presented in subsequent chapters.
Data Sources
Data from two different sources was used to create the database used in this research: Air
Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) accessed through the Air Force Cost and Performance
(AFCAP) tool and Aircraft Maintenance Reports (AMREP) data provided by James Richards
located at HQ AFMC/A4FI Life Cycle Management Branch. The AFTOC database is rather
cumbersome to gather data in a usable format, so the AFCAP tool is used to organize the data in
a manner that is more suitable for manipulation and standardization. AFCAP was designed in
2006 and pulls from five data sources to include AFTOC, Reliability and Maintainability
Information System (REMIS), and the official database of historical USAF flying hour program
information.
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AFCAP version 9.1 is used in this analysis and includes complete data beginning in 1996
through the end of 2016. The advantage of using AFCAP rather than manually gathering the
information from AFTOC, is that AFCAP makes use of pivot tables allowing users to output
only the relevant information and it can apply a multitude of conversion factors. This is most
useful in converting cost data originally reported in then-year dollars in AFTOC, into base-year
dollars with a base year of 2016. Rather than using factors and applying formulas to a
spreadsheet, AFCAP converts the data with a few selections from the main menu. Additionally,
AFCAP is useful in gathering aircraft data at multiple aircraft levels and multiple O&S cost
levels.
While the majority of the data used in this analysis is available through the AFCAP tool,
additional information to build the database is acquired from AMREPs. These reports detail the
depot maintenance for each aircraft tail number and are grouped into the categories of organic
maintenance (planned and unplanned) and contracted maintenance (planned and unplanned).
Because this data is listed by tail number, it is necessary to manipulate into yearly totals in each
category to acquire information about the maintenance depot throughput of each aircraft. A
limitation of this database is that data was only required to be maintained in this format starting
in 2004. This limits the number of available years and data points to analyze depot maintenance
in this research.
Exclusion Criteria for Database
The available AFTOC data in the AFCAP tool is the main source of data used to
determine which airframes have enough viable data for analysis. The data from AMREP only
limits the analysis of depot maintenance (cost subcategory 3.4) to the years of 2004-2016. The
following is a list of exclusion criteria that was applied to achieve a useable dataset:
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1. Aircraft is not manned and fixed wing
2. Aircraft is not currently operated and maintained by the Air Force
3. Cost data does not span at least ten years
4. TAI is less than ten for more than five years
The scope of this research is only on manned, fixed wing aircraft. While the Air Force
has helicopters, unmanned crafts, and other aerial vehicles, fixed wing aircraft make up the
majority of the inventory. Additionally, technology and design difference with these other
aircrafts make it unsuitable to analyze alongside the manned, fixed wing aircrafts. Aircrafts that
are no longer in operation are excluded from this analysis because the goal is to predict future
costs. Additionally, it can be assumed that such aircrafts have been replaced with newer, more
technologically-advanced aircraft. Including data from retired aircrafts might skew the data and
would not accurately reflect the increased cost in the advanced technology used on current
aircraft. Aircraft that did not have cost data for more than ten years is excluded because enough
years of data is necessary to both perform analysis and to check the predictability of the resulting
models. If an airframe has less than ten aircraft for more than five years in Total Available
Inventory (TAI) it is excluded because it comprises such a small fraction of total maintenance
costs and is such a small population size that a few data points can greatly affect the data.
Applying these exclusion criteria to the AFCAP data resulted in twenty-one different airframes
grouped together at the M/D level (A-10, F-16, etc).
Variables
Many variables for each airframe are tracked in AFTOC and the other databases that feed
into AFCAP. Most importantly, the annual maintenance cost data is available for each airframe
and can be easily categorized into the current Cost Assessment and Performance Evaluation
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(CAPE) cost reporting structure used across the military. This data can be viewed in depth at
four different levels. For the purpose of this research, the cost data is gathered at the second
level which details how money is spent in each of the aforementioned maintenance cost
subcategories. Along with the five maintenance subcategories detailed in the O&S Cost
Estimating Guide: 3.1) Consumable Materials and Repair Parts, 3.2) Depot Level Repairables,
3.3) Intermediate Maintenance, 3.4) Depot Maintenance, and 3.5) Other Maintenance; three
additional categories are used to track the money spent on contractor support. These categories
are 3.6) Interim Contractor Support, 3.7) Contractor Logistic Support, and 3.8) Other Contractor
Support.
The Air Force does not record costs in 3.3) Intermediate Maintenance and thus, there is
zero cost data to analyze under this subcategory. This maintenance cost category is largely used
by the other services. Subcategory 3.5) Other Maintenance is a catch-all (without explanation in
AFTOC) for costs that don’t apply to any of the other categories and it is used with little
consistency throughout the dataset. For these purposes, 3.5) Other Maintenance cost data was
removed from the dataset. Additionally, the majority of airframes have little to no data in 3.6)
Interim Contractor Support and 3.8) Other Contractor Support. There is however, ample cost
data recorded in 3.7) Contractor Logistic Support. For this research, analysis is not performed on
the four subcategories that have very little data: 3.3) Intermediate Maintenance, 3.5) Other
Maintenance, 3.6) Interim Contractor Support, and 3.8) Other Contractor Support.
Multiple programmatic variables are available through the AFCAP tool. Programmatic
data includes the variables of TAI, fuel gallons, flying hours, sorties, landings, average aircraft
age, maintenance manhours, total man power, and other variables that were thought to have little
predictive qualities for annual aircraft maintenance. Just like the maintenance cost data, this
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programmatic data is available yearly starting with data from 1996 through 2016. From the
AMREP database, the following variables were created: Total Planned Organic, Total
Unplanned Organic, Total Planned Contractor Logistic Support (CLS), and Total Unplanned
CLS. From the database, totals were extracted for each airframe, for each year. These totals
represent the total throughput of the aircraft maintenance depots. Again, the data related to depot
maintenance is only available starting in 2004 through 2016.
Table 3. Distribution of Percentages of Annual Costs for Organic Airframes
Maintenance
Subcategory
3.1
3.2
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8

Mean
15.1%
42.6%
33.8%
0.0%
0.0%
6.3%
0.0%

Lower 95%
8.2%
30.7%
20.3%
0.0%
0.0%
1.9%
0.0%

Upper 95%
22.0%
54.4%
47.3%
0.0%
0.0%
10.7%
0.0%

Table 4. Distribution of Percentages of Annual Costs for Contractor Logistic Support Airframes
Maintenance
Subcategory
3.1
3.2
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8

Mean
1.0%
0.9%
0.7%
0.0%
0.0%
96.6%
0.0%

Lower 95%
0.2%
-0.2%
-0.8%
0.0%
0.0%
93.0%
0.0%

Upper 95%
1.7%
2.0%
2.2%
0.0%
0.0%
100.3%
0.0%

Using the available data, some additional variables can be extracted. Using the total
maintenance costs to determine the percentage of money spent annually in each of the
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maintenance subcategories, it is evident that an aircraft falls into one of two categories: organic
maintenance or contracted maintenance. Those aircraft that had more than twenty percent of
their annual maintenance costs spent in 3.7) Contractor Logistic Support are categorized as
airframes maintained through contractor logistic support (CLS). Of the twenty-one airframes in
this database, ten fall into this category: C-12, C-17, C-20, C-21, E-8, F-22, KC-10, T-1, T-6,
and the U-2. The other airframes are maintained mostly organically and account from the
remaining eleven airframes in the dataset: A-10, B-1, B-2, B-52, C-130, C-5, E-3, F-15, F-16,
KC-135, and the T-38. Table 3 and Table 4 display the mean and 95% confidence intervals of
the percentage of money spent in each maintenance subcategory when the airframes are
categorized organic or CLS. For organic airframes, maintenance subcategories 3.1, 3.2, and 3.4
account for an average of 91.5% of annual maintenance costs and for CLS airframes,
maintenance subcategory 3.7 accounts for 96.6% of annual maintenance costs. This distinction
of organic or CLS determine which airframe to include in the predictive models for each of the
maintenance subcategories.
Another variable that is added to the database is a binary variable to indicate if an aircraft
is classified as stealthy. One of the measures of stealth for aircraft is the radar cross section
(RCS), which is a measure of how detectable an object is to radar and typically has units of
meters squared. Only two aircraft currently used by the Air Force were originally designed with
stealth in mind, the B-2 and the F-22 with respective RCS measurements of 0.1m2 and
approximately 0.0001m2, about the size of a marble (Richardson, 2001). For reference, the B-52
has an RCS of about 100m2. Through specific design features and upgrades, the B-1 and the F15 have relatively small RCS measurements when compared to other bombers and fighters and
can be considered stealthy (Grining, 2000). The variable of stealth is included in the database
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because of the added technology that is required to make an aircraft stealthy. Using an extracted
variable from AMREP, a new variable is created by dividing total planned depot maintenance by
TAI. This variable expresses an annual percentage of aircraft that are expected to go through
depot maintenance. Another independent variable was created by lagging the dependent variable
of standardized annual cost by one year. Lastly, dichotomous variables are created to categorize
airframes into their primary missions. The following categories are created: attack/fighter,
bomber, cargo/tanker, reconnaissance, and trainer.
Standardization
To be able to compare cost data across multiple years, the first step to standardizing the
data is ensure that all costs are adjusted for inflation. To transform the data, the AFCAP tool
applies OSD inflation index for Operations and Maintenance (3400) to convert all data into baseyear 2016 dollars. Due to the varying nature of each of the maintenance cost subcategories, they
are analyzed separate from each other. Additionally, each of these categories will need to be
standardized differently to reflect what is charged to each of the categories and so the cost data
can be analyzed across airframes.
The first subcategory is 3.1) Consumable Materials and Repair Parts and is comprised of
costs incurred by the operating unit for parts that are needed in maintenance of the aircraft. For
this subcategory, cost data will be transformed into a cost per aircraft per flying hour. The
airframe’s annual TAI and flying hour data from AFCAP is used to calculate this cost variable.
The 3.2) Depot Level Repairables subcategory consists of costs for parts that are sent to the
depots to be repaired. The operating unit is then charged for the transport, storage, labor and
material for the repairs. This cost category will also be standardized using values from each
airframe’s annual TAI and flying hours to create a cost per aircraft per flying hour. The
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maintenance subcategory 3.4) Depot Maintenance is comprised of costs incurred from major
maintenance events, usually of entire systems rather than smaller parts. This cost subcategory
includes costs from both organic and contractor depot maintenance. Most depot maintenance is
planned and follows a routine schedule, but depot maintenance can also be unplanned. Rather
than standardizing this subcategory with TAI and flying hours, it will be standardized by the total
planned (organic and CLS) depot maintenance or the throughput of the depots. The same values
of annual TAI and flying hours used for subcategories 3.1 and 3.2 are used to standardize the
final maintenance cost subcategory being analyzed, 3.7) Contractor Logistic Support. Because
detailed information is not available on the maintenance performed by the contractors is can only
be speculated that these values are appropriate for standardization.
Assumptions
Before performing the analysis, it’s important to state some required assumptions. It’s
unlikely that every aircraft tail number has an equivalent usage rate and similarly, it’s unfeasible
that each tail number requires the same maintenance. However, to perform the analysis, it must
be assumed that every tail number has equivalent usage and requires maintenance at the same
rate. Each airframe represented in the database is a rollup of all the variants. Doing this reduces
the number of different airframes represented in the database, but it also allows for more data
points to be included. For example, some individual variants when not rolled up with their
respective other variants, would have been excluded based on the previously established
exclusion criteria. By lumping aircraft variants together, it must be assumed that each variant
requires similar maintenance elements and will incur similar maintenance costs.
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Methodology – Stepwise Regression
The main program used to perform the analysis is JMP, a statistical tool capable of
performing regression analysis and producing graphics for large databases. To build models for
each of the maintenance cost subcategories, stepwise regression is used to determine the
variables that are predictive. Stepwise regression is a method of performing regression analysis
that determines predictive variables based on prespecified criteria. Regression models built with
a stepwise approach can be built starting with no variables in the model and adding the variables
that create a better fit model, which is called a forward approach. A backward approach starts
with a model that includes all variables and then removes variables to increase the fit of the
model. A mixed, or bidirectional, approach makes use of both the forward and backward
approaches at each step. This analysis makes use of the mixed approach to perform the stepwise
analysis and determine the predictive variables. Inclusion and exclusion criteria of the variables
in the model is based on a p-value threshold of 0.1.
In creating the models in JMP, the dependent variable is the standardized annual cost of
the maintenance cost subcategories and the independent variables are any other variables that
have been gathered in the database. Once JMP selects the predictive variables according the
previously mentioned parameters (mixed approach with a p-value threshold of 0.1), the fit of the
model is assessed and assumptions are checked.
Model Fit and Assumptions Check
First, the selected variables are checked to see if any multicollinearity is present.
Analyzing the variance inflation factor (VIF) score provides insight into variables that may be
correlated. Generally, a maximum value of 5 for VIF scores is desirable but lower values are
preferred. Higher VIF scores indicate that two or more variables are correlated and thus one
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needs to be removed from the model. The model is also checked for influential data points by
plotting the Cook’s Distance Influence values. Data points that fall above the generally accepted
0.5 threshold are overly influential and have too much effect on the p-values of the model’s
explanatory variable(s). Another check for outliers is performed by graphing a histogram of the
studentized residuals. Data points that fall outside of three standard deviations from the mean
have the potential to be outliers. Any outliers should be assessed to provide an explanation and
may possibly be excluded from the database if appropriate.
In addition to testing the fit of the model, it is also necessary to check two residual
assumptions: normality and constant variance of model residuals. Normality is tested by running
a Shapiro-Wilk test on the residuals. A model passes the normality test if the p-value associated
with the Shapiro-Wilk test is greater than the established alpha of 0.05. The model is assessed
for constant variance by viewing the residual by predicted plot or by calculating the BreuschPagan value. Again, a chart that appears to have random data points passes the assumption of
constant variance. A chart that appears to have a triangle or diamond pattern means variance is
not constant. Ideally, a good predictive model will be a good fit of the data and will pass all
assumptions. This iterative process is executed for each of the maintenance subcategories with
some additional exclusions made with each attempt at building a regression model.
Regression Results
The regression model for maintenance subcategory 3.1 starts with 198 possible data
points from the eleven airframes categorized as organic from the years 1997 to 2014. The first
year of data (1996) from each airframe is not used because of the effect from the lag variable of
the dependent variable and the last two years of data (2015-2016) are not included in that
analysis because they will be used to assess the predictive capabilities of the model. After an
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initial run of the stepwise regression model, it is clear the B-2 data points are different from the
other points. The standardized values of the B-2 are in the hundreds, while the standardized
values of the other airframes mostly range from less than one to about twenty. Because of this
difference with the B-2, it is excluded from the analysis and the model is rerun.
After a close look at the Cook’s D influence scatterplot and an iterative process of
running the model, excluding outliers, and rerunning the model; an additional thirteen data points
are removed from the final model. Six rows from the B-1 and seven rows from the E-3. These
data points fall under the generally accepted Cook’s D Influence threshold of 0.5; however, they
are values that stand out considerably from the rest of the data points. Upon inspection of these
thirteen data points, it is evident that there are fluctuations in the raw cost values that are not
explained through the information available in the dataset. A detailed list of excluded data points
is available in Appendix C. The final model for maintenance subcategory 3.1 included 167 data
points and Table 5 displays the summary of fit and parameter estimates for the model. The full
JMP output of each of the models is shown in Appendix D. The only variable for maintenance
subcategory 3.1 that the regression model flagged as significant was the lagged standardized
cost.
Table 5. Regression Model Summary for Maintenance Subcategory 3.1
Summary
R Squared 0.981926
R Squared Adj 0.981817
F Ratio 8964.297
Prob > F <.0001

Parameter Estimates
Term Estimate t Ratio Prob > |t|
1.36
0.1746
Intercept 0.24331
94.68
<.0001
Standardized Cost Lag 1
0.9979

The data from the regression model for maintenance subcategory 3.2 initially has 198
data points from all eleven organically maintained aircraft from the years 1997 to 2014. Just like
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with the previous regression model, the use of a lag variable of the response results in an
inability to use the first year of available data from 1996. Additionally, the last two years of data
are removed from the regression model to validate the model. A stepwise regression model is
run with all the available independent variables and all 198 data points. Again, it is clear that the
B-2 has much larger response values than the other ten airframes. Rerunning the regression
model without the data points from the B-2 provides a clearer picture into potential outliers
within the remaining ten airframes.
An iterative process of running the regression model, analyzing the Cook’s D Influence
graph, and investigating data points for potential removal if they were thought to be outliers.
This process highlights a few data points from the B-1, B-52, C-5, and E-3 that have the potential
to be outliers. A total of 19 rows from the previously mentioned airframes are removed after
looking into each data point for a potential explanation into why it flags as an outlier on the
Cook’s D Influence chart. Appendix C contains a detailed list of the excluded data points. The
remaining 161 data points are included in the regression model which returned three dependent
variables as significant. Similar to the model for maintenance category 3.1, the lag variable of
the standardized annual costs is the most significant variable for the 3.2 model. Additionally, the
dichotomous variables for reconnaissance and bomber aircraft are significant. Parameter
estimates and other model outputs are in Table 6 and the full model details are in Appendix D.
Table 6. Regression Model Summary for Maintenance Subcategory 3.2
Summary
0.987767
R Squared
0.987534
R Squared Adj
F Ratio
4225.882
Prob > F
<.0001

Parameter Estimates
Term Estimate t Ratio Prob > |t|
2.77
0.0064
Intercept 1.90255
56.92
<.0001
Standardized Cost Lag 1 0.83333
Reconnaissance 11.2614
3.68
0.0003
Bomber 17.0021
6.51
<.0001
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The costs from maintenance subcategory 3.4 are the only response variables that are
standardized by something other than flying hours and TAI. Rather, these costs are standardized
using the total annual depot throughput. This data is only available beginning in 2004 through
2016 resulting in a smaller initial number of data points to include in the analysis. A total of 110
data points from eleven organically maintained airframes from 2005 to 2014 is reduced to 99
data points after the B-2 is again removed along with one data point from the E-3 that stands out
on the Cook’s D Influence chart after running the initial regression model. The final model
consists of five variables with the lagged standardized cost being the most significant variable.
The percentage of TAI that was planned to go through the depot along with dichotomous
variables for trainer, fighter/attack, and reconnaissance are the remaining significant variables in
the model. This model has a comparatively lower R Squared value to the previous two models
and the following model as well. A summary and full details of the model are present in Table 7
and Appendix D, respectively.
Table 7. Regression Model Summary for Maintenance Subcategory 3.4
Summary
0.750171
R Squared
0.73674
R Squared Adj
F Ratio
55.851
Prob > F
<.0001

Term
Intercept
Standardized Cost Lag 1
Percent TAI in Depot
Fighter/Attack
Reconnaissance
Trainer

Parameter Estimates
Estimate
t Ratio Prob > |t|
5.97
<.0001
6913092
7.9
<.0001
0.57957
-12483067
-4.44
<.0001
-3077048
-3.44
0.0009
3758084
3.04
0.0031
-4929644
-3.78
0.0003

The fourth and final model is the only model that attempts to predict cost for the ten
airframes that are mostly maintained through Contractor Logistic Support. Using the same
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iterative process of running a stepwise regression and using the Cook’s D Influence chart to spot
outliers for potential removal results in a continual process of new data points pulling away from
the pack on the Cook’s D Influence chart. A model with all initial 167 data points has a weak R
Squared value and overall poor results. This model attempts to find a happy medium of
excluding data points that flagged as clear outliers on the Cook’s D Influence and maintaining
enough data points to be able to conduct analysis and provide usable results.
Table 8. Regression Model Summary for Maintenance Subcategory 3.7
Summary
0.902272
R Squared
0.901149
R Squared Adj
F Ratio
803.23
Prob > F
<.0001

Parameter Estimates
Term Estimate t Ratio Prob > |t|
1.86
0.066
Intercept 3.94719
28.34
<.0001
Standardized Cost Lag 1 0.94154

Nearly half of the data points are removed, including all data points from the E-8, F-22,
and the U-2. The F-22 along with the T-6 are clearly phasing into operation and take a few years
for costs to stabilize. Additionally, there is unexplained fluctuation in cost data in the C-12 and
C-20 which each have a few data points that are removed from the final model. The removal of
all these data points reduces the over usefulness of this model and limits its predictability to only
those airframes not excluded from the model. The detailed list of removed variables for this
model is available in Appendix C. The settled upon model in this case has a total of 89 data
points from only six different airframes and the only variable that is significant is the lagged
standardized cost. Table 8 shows a summary of the model for maintenance category 3.4 and
Appendix D shows the full details of the model. The reader should note that while the process
for removing potential outliers is an objective process heavily utilizing the Cook’s D Influence
chart, the point at which the researcher stops removing potential outliers is a subjective decision.
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In this case, removing any more data points has the potential for degrading the model and
diminishing its usefulness.
Model Fit and Assumption Results
Each model’s fit is assessed and the assumptions are checked as the respective data points
are removed. All four of the models have VIF scores lower than then the generally accepted
standard five. This means that the variables chosen for each model don’t exhibit any
multicollinearity. None of the models have data points have Cook’s D Influence values that are
greater than 0.5. This standard is a good initial check, but this dataset requires additional
scrutiny in the Cook’s D Influence charts. Some values, while technically below the 0.5
threshold, have values much larger than the majority of values. Those data points that are
thought to have too much influence on the models are removed to increase the predictability of
the model. The Cook’s D Influence values are the main indicator of potential outliers in this
analysis. A histogram of the studentized residuals shows how many of the data points fall within
+/- 3 standard deviations. The models for maintenance subcategories 3.1, 3.2, and 3.4 all have
studentized residuals within +/- 3 standard deviations and the model for 3.7 has two points that
fall outside of the boundaries. All four of the models fail the normality test; histograms of the
residuals spike in the middle more than a normal curve. All models passed the test for constant
variance.
Validation
Before any analysis is run and models are built, a subset of the data is set aside to test the
predictive capabilities of each model. For this dataset, a subset of the last two years of data is
used for the validation process. Predictive equations built from the parameter estimates of each
model’s significant variables provide the framework for calculating the standardized annual cost
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in each of the four maintenance subcategories. The inputs for the model equations are all values
that are available ahead of time to predict the following year’s maintenance cost. The lagged
standardized cost is taken from the previous year and the mission (bomber, trainer,
reconnaissance) of the aircraft is also known. In the case of the model for 3.4, the percent of TAI
in the depot is calculated using variables that should also be known ahead of time: planned
number of aircraft to enter the depot and the Total Available Inventory.
The prediction estimate from each of the models is compared to the actual costs in each
maintenance subcategory for years 2015 and 2016. The predictions and actuals are compared by
calculating the absolute percent difference in the values. In addition to the model approach
presented in this thesis, the actuals were also compared to the mean and median costs of each
airframe and the status quo method of increasing the previous year’s actuals by two percent.
Table 9 shows the results of each method and highlights the best and worst approach for each of
the categories. In no case did the models presented in this thesis predict the annual maintenance
cost better than the status quo approach. For each maintenance subcategory, the mean and
median cost approaches are farthest off the mark.
Table 9. Validation Results: Absolute Percent Difference of Actuals vs. Predictions
Maintenance Subcategory
Model Approach
Mean
Median
Status Quo (2%)

3.1
11.60%
36.10%
56.20%
6.57%

3.2
16.30%
22.40%
27.50%
11.01%

3.4
46.80%
43.60%
54.60%
12.53%

3.7
27.10%
78.80%
135.70%
16.35%

Summary
This chapter details the steps taken to create predictive models for four of the eight
established cost subcategories that the Air Force uses to report their annual maintenance
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expenses. To create a comprehensive database ready for analysis, exclusion criteria is applied,
and the data is standardized to be able to compare the values across years and airframes. After
assumptions are established, the program JMP is used to perform stepwise regression analysis
creating models for each maintenance cost subcategory. These models are then critiqued on their
fit and their assumptions are checked. Lastly, the models’ predictions are then pitted against a
subset of actual annual maintenance cost data to test their predictive capabilities. It’s evident
from Table 9 that each of the models do not do a better job at predicting annual maintenance cost
than the status quo. Chapter Four acts as a standalone article that briefly highlights the main
points of this thesis but focuses on the results of the analysis.
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Evaluating Annual Fixed Wing Maintenance Costs

Abstract

Maintaining Air Force fixed winged aircraft represents approximately one-third of annual
Operating and Support costs. Of twenty-one different airframes grouped together at the MissionDesign Series (MDS), maintenance subcategories 3.1) Consumable Materials and Repair Parts,
3.2) Depot Level Repairables (DLRs), and 3.4) Depot Maintenance accounted for, an average,
91.5% of annual organic maintenance costs. For contractor maintained MDS, subcategory 3.7)
Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) accounted for 96.6% of annual maintenance costs. A
regression approach was investigated to identify possible cost drivers for each subcategory.
After accounting for inflation, total available inventory, flying hours, and the total planned
(organic and CLS) depot maintenance, the strongest driver of current year costs are last year’s
cost. The data suggests an overall maintenance year over year cost growth of 1.8%, with an
increase of 2.5% and 3.8% year over year attributable to depot maintenance and DLRs,
respectively.

Key Words: Operating and Support, Depot Level Repairables, Depot Maintenance, Contractor
Logistic Support
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Evaluating Annual Fixed Wing Maintenance Costs

Background

Given the Air Force’s mission and its aim for air superiority, the service’s operations are
centered around aircraft, particular those considered fixed wing. A current hot issue in the news
and on the mind of Congress is the rising price tag of the F-35. It is important to understand
what the definition of “cost” encompasses in the numbers that are being reported. As reported
by Mizokami (2017) the overall estimated cost for the requested 2,456 F-35 aircraft is $406.5
billion. This cost includes research and development, testing and evaluation, the actual purchase
of the aircraft, and building new facilities to support this weapon system. However, this dollar
figure does not include any of the costs that will be required for operating and maintaining this
fleet of aircraft for its useable lifetime. The most current F-35 estimate for long term Operations
and Support (O&S) sits at $1.1 trillion if the aircraft is flown until the projected year 2070
(Capaccio, 2017).
The F-35 is not alone in its high associated costs with respect to O&S. The life cycle cost
(LCC) of a system accounts for an all-inclusive and exhaustive dollar amount the government
incurs from “cradle to grave” or from the initial concept of a system to the end of a system being
phased out. Thus, a system’s LCC can be described as the sum of the acquisition costs and the
remaining category of O&S costs plus disposal. The acquisition phase of a system is relatively
shorter and under tighter control as compared to the O&S phase of a system; however, it is often
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the decisions made early in the system’s life cycle that drive the total LCC (Defense
Standardization Program Office, 2016).
Considering the entire service life of a major weapon system, the O&S phase is the
costliest and comprises approximately 72% of a program’s overall cost (Defense Systems
Management College, 1997). This percentage is an average and varies from system to system.
In an attempt to determine an appropriate percentage to represent the mean percentage of O&S
costs to the total LCC, Jones et al. (2014) used defense related sources to estimate this O&S
percentage. Their findings indicate this percentage ranged from a low of 24% to as a high of
90%, depending on the weapon system. For fixed wing aircraft, these percentages ranged from
53% to 65%.
Because O&S costs are not a one-time requirement, but rather an ongoing yearly cost of
maintaining a weapon system, one would think that such an expense would be heavily
scrutinized. It was not until recently that O&S cost estimates became an important piece of the
equation (GAO, 2010). The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009
formally brought a new set of mandated requirements along with a shift in emphasis to O&S
estimates. Section 304 of the Act lays out the expectation for the Comptroller General to review
and report on O&S costs. In addition to monitoring actual O&S costs and rates of growth in
O&S costs for all major weapon systems, this publication requires that active measures are taken
by the Department of Defense (DoD) to reduce O&S costs.
Just as a system’s LCC can be partitioned into categories, O&S costs can also be further
subdivided into a standard Cost Element Structure (CES). The CES delineated by the OSD Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) O&S guide is comprised of six top-level elements
as shown in Table 10. According to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD, 2014),
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maintenance (CES 3.0), accounts for approximately a third of all O&S costs, with manpower
(CES 1.0) accounting for the next highest at approximately 31%. Considering annual
maintenance costs for all aircraft owned and operated by the United States Air Force (USAF)
over the entire life of those aircraft, one begins to realize this maintenance cost can become a
sizeable amount of money quickly. If aircraft maintenance is such a large portion of defense
spending, then it is imperative to obtain accurate annual cost estimates. This increased accuracy
could better support program managers and enhance USAF’s mission.

[Insert Table 10]

While it’s true that WSARA sparked the increase into research on O&S costs, there have
still been a surprisingly small number of studies that have been performed on the topic. Ryan et
al. (2012), Ryan et al, (2013), and Jones et al. (2014) have recently investigated O&S cost
estimates, but a study by Hildebrandt and Sze (1990) analyzing fixed wing aircraft O&S cost is
particularly relevant to this research. Obtaining available data from the Visibility and
Management of Operation & Support Cost (VAMSOC) system from 1981-1986, they used a loglinear regression approach and concluded that assuming all other things equal, a one-year
increase of an aircraft’s age will bring an approximate 1.7% increase to the total O&S costs. Or
comparably, the current O&S cost of an aircraft system increases from the previous year’s by
1.7%.
Even though dated almost thirty years ago, this percent is very close to the anecdotal
percentage of the current approach to estimating annual maintenance costs. The modern
approach entails using the previous year’s maintenance cost adjusted according to the most
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current OSD inflation table and adding an additional 2% for escalation (Ronning, 2017). Our
literature review did not find any archival journal or official guide that documents this method or
percentage. Therefore, this article entails to empirically study and model the percentage increase
of O&S costs for fixed wing aircraft from year-to-year and determine a more accurate percentage
for practitioners to use.

Database and Methods

The Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) Management Information System tracks
annual aircraft maintenance costs for the USAF. The database was developed in response to a
call by the Secretary of Defense in the year 2000 to provide more visibility into the life cycle
cost of weapon systems (Mandelbaum and Pallas, 2001). In addition to cost data, the system
extracts information from a number of sources to also include manning numbers, flying hours,
inventory data and other aircraft specific programmatic information. Data in AFTOC dates back
to as early as 1996 for some aircraft.
The O&S Cost Estimating Guide further subdivides the CES of Table 10 into subelements. For CES 3.0, maintenance, there are eight sub-elements. See Table 11. Consumable
Materials and Repair Parts include the cost of items used to support maintenance of the primary
system (including fuel). DLR costs are those that the unit incurs when the system is repaired at a
depot. Intermediate Maintenance consists of costs that are incurred at intermediate maintenance
locations. Depot Maintenance consists of costs for labor and materials when major overhauls are
performed on the primary system. The Other Maintenance category is used for any maintenance
cost that is not already captured by a previous cost category (OSD, 2014). Lastly, for the
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contractor subcategories (Interim Contractor Support, Contractor Logistics Support, and Other
Contractor Support), there is little insight into the specifics through AFTOC as the data in these
categories simply track an annual cost.

[Insert Table 11]

Using AFTOC, annual maintenance cost data is available for each airframe and can be
viewed down to the fourth cost element level. For the purpose of this article, the cost data is
gathered at the second level (corresponding to Table 11) which details how money is spent in
each of the aforementioned maintenance cost subcategories. With respect to 3.3) Intermediate
Maintenance, the USAF does not record these costs since this maintenance category is used by
the other services. Subcategory 3.5) Other Maintenance is a catch-all and is used inconsistently.
Additionally, the majority of airframes studied have little to no data in 3.6) Interim Contractor
Support and 3.8) Other Contractor Support. Consequently because of these reasons, analysis is
not performed on the four subcategories that have very little data: 3.3) Intermediate
Maintenance, 3.5) Other Maintenance, 3.6) Interim Contractor Support, and 3.8) Other
Contractor Support. As shown in the results section, this had little affect on the outcome of the
analysis.
The AFTOC system can be relatively cumbersome to gather requisite data, so the Air
Force Cost and Performance (AFCAP) tool is utilized to extract the majority of data needed for
analysis. AFCAP version 9.1 is used to pull AFTOC maintenance data spanning from 1996
through the end of 2016. While the majority of the data used in this analysis was available
through the AFCAP tool, additional information was acquired from Aircraft Maintenance
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Reports (AMREP). These reports detail the depot maintenance for each aircraft tail number and
are grouped into the categories of organic maintenance (planned and unplanned) and contracted
maintenance (planned and unplanned). Because this data is listed by tail number, it is necessary
to aggregate into yearly totals in each category to acquire information about the maintenance
depot throughput of each aircraft platform. A limitation of this database is that data was only
required to be maintained in this format starting in 2004. This limits the number of available
years and data points to analyze depot maintenance in this research.
Once all the data was acquired from either AFTOC via AFCAP or through AMREPs,
data standardization is performed in order to account for inflation effects, flying hours, and
throughput since these affect costs if left unaccounted. Using OSD’s appropriation inflation
tables, all dollar amounts are converted into base-year 2016 dollars. Due to the varying nature of
each of the maintenance cost subcategories analyzed in this paper: 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, and 3.7, they are
analyzed separately and are further standardized as follows. For subcategories 3.1, 3.2, and 3.7,
base year costs are further standardized per aircraft per flying hour. The airframe’s annual Total
Available Inventory (TAI) and flying hour data from AFCAP are used for this conversion. For
subcategory 3.4) Depot Maintenance, this includes costs from both organic and contractor depot
maintenance. Rather than standardizing this subcategory with TAI and flying hours, it is
standardized by the total planned (organic and CLS) depot maintenance or the throughput of the
depots.
The scope of this research is only on manned, fixed wing aircraft. While the Air Force
has helicopters, unmanned crafts, and other aerial vehicles, fixed wing aircraft make up the
majority of the inventory. Fixed wing aircraft that are no longer in operation are excluded from
this analysis; including data from retired aircraft might skew the data and would not accurately
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reflect the increased cost in the advanced technology used on current aircraft. Aircraft that did
not have cost data for more than ten years are also excluded in order to prevent a few years of
data being extrapolated into longer patterns of maintenance costs. Lastly, if an airframe has less
than ten aircraft for more than five years in TAI it is excluded because it comprises such a small
fraction of total maintenance costs and is such a small population size that a few data points can
greatly skew the results.
The analysis of the final cost database are broken into two sections: a descriptive analysis
of the information broken into the respective subcategories to illustrate where the bulk of the
maintenance costs are encountered, and secondly: a regression analysis using Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) is adopted to determine which variables appear to be statistically significant of
the standardized cost data. For the OLS piece, a mixed stepwise procedure is adopted. A level
of significance is set to 0.01 to determine initial predictive ability of an explanatory variable.
From there, the preliminary selected variables are investigated to determine their practical effect
on the respective model. If a particular explanatory variable is determined to have less than a 1%
relative effect on a particular model’s response, then that variable is excluded. This is done to
minimize a variable being statistically significant but having little practical effect. All analysis
in this article used JMP 12 Pro, Excel or R.
With respect to possible predictive explanatory variables to consider, many are obtained
via AFTOC. For example, AFTOC contains programmatic data such as number of sorties,
number of landings, average aircraft age, maintenance manhours, and total man power.
Additionally, a dichotomous variable is included to determine if organically maintained versus
contractor maintained has an affect on standardized cost. Those aircraft that had more than
twenty percent of their annual maintenance costs spent in 3.7) Contractor Logistic Support are
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considered as contractor airframes in comparison to less than twenty percent for organically
maintained. Other explanatory variables considered include whether an aircraft is classified as
stealthy, ratio of total planned depot maintenance to TAI, the previous year’s standardized cost
data, and lastly airframe categories such as attack/fighter, bomber, cargo/tanker, reconnaissance,
and trainer.
As with any OLS analysis, the customary residual assumptions of normality and constant
variance are tested by utilizing the Shapiro-Wilk test and the Breusch-Pagan test, respectively.
Both are conducted at the 0.05 level of significance. Additionally, multicollinearity, outliers, and
influential data points are investigated in order to prevent model bias. Variance Inflation Factors
(VIF) highlight the linear relationship between independent variables and a VIF score higher
than 5 suggests multicollinearity. Regarding outliers, any studentized residual greater than three
standard deviations is categorized as an outlier and a possible source of concern. Lastly, Cook's
Distance detects overly influential data points possibly skewing the results. Any value greater
than 0.5 is investigated closely.
Before performing the analysis, it’s important to state some required assumptions. It’s
unlikely that every aircraft tail number has an equivalent usage rate and similarly, it’s unfeasible
that each tail number requires the same maintenance. However, to perform the analysis, it must
be assumed that every tail number has equivalent usage and requires maintenance at the same
rate. Each airframe represented in the database is a rollup of all the variants. Doing this reduces
the number of different airframes represented in the database, but it also allows for more data
points to be included. For example, some individual variants when not rolled up with their
respective other variants would have been excluded based on the previously established
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exclusion criteria. By grouping aircraft variants together, it must be assumed that each variant
requires similar maintenance elements and will incur similar maintenance costs.

Results

Applying the exclusionary criteria to the AFTOC database via the AFCAP tool, as
previously aforementioned, resulted in twenty-one different airframes grouped together at the
Mission-Design Series (MDS) level (A-10, F-16, etc). Table 12 highlights those programs
incorporated in this paper’s analysis. Of these twenty-one MDS, ten are maintained through
Contractor Logistics Support (CLS), while the other eleven are maintained mostly organically.
Tables 13 and 14 display the mean percentage of costs for each maintenance subcategory when
the airframes are categorized as organic or CLS. For organic MDS, maintenance subcategories
3.1, 3.2, and 3.4 account, an average, 91.5% of annual maintenance costs and for CLS MDS,
maintenance subcategory 3.7 accounts for 96.6% of annual maintenance costs. The percentages
do not sum to 100%. To minimize the impact of outliers in maintenance costs, median
percentages were first calculated for each MDS as a more robust measure of cost. Then, means
were calculated across all the respective MDS.

[Insert Tables 12-14]

In order to investigate likely predictors of annual maintenance cost of organic MDS,
individual OLS analyses are conducted for subcategories 3.1, 3.2, and 3.4. For CLS MDS, the
only OLS analysis conducted is for subcategory 3.7. Starting with subcategory 3.1 (Consumable
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Materials and Repair Parts), 231 points are initially available for analysis spanning years 19962016. However, because past annual cost may be a possible predictor of current annual cost, the
first year of data (1996) for each MDS is lost due to lack of data for 1995. This reduction results
in an effective sample size of 220 data points. The OLS assumptions of normality and constant
variance of residuals were not initially satisfied until a natural logarithm transformation was
conducted on the response, annual maintenance cost adjusted for inflation, flying hour, and TAI.
Table 15 highlights the results from conducting the stepwise regression for subcategory 3.1. The
dominant factor associated with current annual cost is last year’s annual cost. The inflation
adjusted price for a barrel of oil did not flag as significant for this category, despite 3.1 being
often associated with fuel cost. Table 15, and subsequent tables, also includes R2 (coefficient of
determination) for the untransformed data as a comparison since the transformation to address
OLS residual assumptions often artificially increases R2 in the transformed case.

[Insert Table 15]

When investigating factors associated with subcategories 3.2, 3.4, and 3.7 maintenance
costs, a similar logic to that conducted of subcategory 3.1 is adopted. That is, investigating prior
year’s maintenance cost results in losing the first year of data for each MDS (1996 for 3.2 and
3.7; 2004 for 3.4). Additionally, the natural logarithm transformation is required to alleviate
issues due to non-normality and heteroscedasticity of OLS residuals. Table 16 highlights the
results for subcategory 3.2 (Depot Level Repairables), Table 17 for subcategory 3.4 (Depot
Maintenance), and lastly Table 18 for subcategory 3.7 (Contractor Logistics Support). Effective
samples sizes consist of 220, 132, 186 points, respectively. Analyzing subcategory 3.4 resulted
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in the smallest effective sample size due to AMREP data only available from 2004 onwards.
With respect to subcategory 3.7, which involved CLS, only ten MDS were available instead of
eleven for organically maintained. An additional fourteen points were unavailable due to
missing data, notably seven for the F-22 and four for the T-6.

[Insert Table 16-18]

Similar to the results of Table 15 for subcategory 3.1, the previous year’s standardized
cost is the most predictive driver for current standardized cost. In other words, after accounting
for inflation and then either flying hours and TAI for subcategories 3.1, 3.2, and 3.7 or total
planned (organic and CLS) depot maintenance (or the throughput of the depots), no other
explanatory variable effectively predicted annual maintenance other than the previous year’s
maintenance cost. On average, the analysis suggests an overall increase over time that does not
appear to be attributable to aging aircraft or any other variable considered once accounting for
prior year’s cost. This also includes investigating how closely maintenance costs track with the
overall DoD budget.
To assess the effect of how past maintenance cost is associated with current maintenance
cost, the percent difference from last year’s maintenance was calculated for each MDS for
subcategories: 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, and 3.7. As before, all costs were standardized amounts for that
respective subcategory. Since means can be extremely affected by even a single outlier for a
year, median values were calculated instead. For 3.1) Consumable Materials and Repair Parts,
the median percent increase from year to year is 1.6%. For 3.2) DLRs, this percent increases to
3.8%. For 3.4) Depot Maintenance, this percent drops to 2.5%. Lastly, for 3.7) CLS, the median
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percentage increase is 0%. If investigated at a complete macro level at the 3.X maintenance
level with no consideration of subcategories, and accounting for extreme values both large and
small (approximately 2.3% of the data), the approximate median percentage is 1.8%, year over
year.

Conclusion

This article’s purpose was two-fold. One, empirically document and model the
percentage increase of O&S costs for fixed wing aircraft from year-to-year and determine a more
accurate percentage for practitioners to use. And secondly, to place into the archival realm
another reference for other researchers to consider and from which to springboard other O&S
topics to investigate. There are many published refereed articles regarding the acquisition of
weapon systems, but little to date on the O&S side of the USAF. Within O&S costs, aircraft
maintenance requires a sizeable budget and inaccurate estimates can have large impacts on the
future of Air Force programs.
Utilizing O&S maintenance data obtained from AFTOC and AMREPs for twenty-one
MDS, the analysis convincing showed that the previous year’s maintenance cost data for
subcategories 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, and 3.7 is highly correlated with the current year maintenance cost
data. All dollar amounts were standardized for inflation, flying hours, TAI, and depot
throughput accordingly. For all categories, except 3.7, standardized costs rose year over year.
For CLS, maintenance subcategory 3.7, the median percentage increase was 0%. This does not
imply that the raw cost of CLS has not increased over time. Instead, the data for this study
suggests that after accounting for inflation, flying hours, and TAI, CLS has remained constant in
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the aggregate sense. At first glance, this does seem to contradict Boito, Cook, and Graser (2009)
who suggest that although CLS costs and organic costs appear to be comparable, both are
increasing over time. However, their analysis did not account for flying hours or TAI, just
inflation.
Regarding subcategories 3.1, 3.2, and 3.4, after accounting for inflation and then either
flying hours, TAI, or depot throughput, all have increased year every year. These standardized
costs have risen, in the median sense, 1.6%, 3.8%, and 2.5%, respectively. Such sediment is also
reflected by Boito, Cook, and Graser (2009) who further state in their findings that depot
maintenance for aircraft and engines accounted for roughly 41 percent of CLS costs, while spare
and repair parts accounted for another roughly 22 percent of CLS costs. Moreover, the
percentile increase of 1.6%, 3.8%, and 2.5% are consistent with other past results, and in keeping
with the USAF’s anecdotal use of multiplying last year’s maintenance costs with 2% (Ronning,
2017) for next year’s estimates. In fact, the overall 3.X median increase for this study’s database
places this percentage slightly lower at 1.8% year over year. This closely aligns with
Hildebrandt and Sze’s (1990) percentage of 1.7%. These collective findings reflect a long-term
consistent growth in O&S costs that are not accounted for by either flying hours, TAI, or depot
throughput. An aging fleet would seem to be the likely driver, however, in none of the analyses
for subcategories 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, and 3.7 did an MDS age appreciatively account for predicting
current year’s standardized cost.
The higher median percentile increase of 2.5% and 3.8% year over year are attributable to
depot maintenance and DLRs, respectively. These percentages are similar to the findings of
Ferry (2013) who determined that the Cost Growth Above Inflation (CGAI) in O&S costs in raw
materials for USAF fixed winged aircraft appear to be approximately 3% year over year. It is
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speculated that this annual increase might be due to replacing aircraft parts that are either
becoming rare or obsolete. That is, the actual age of the aircraft itself is not causing this
unaccounted for CGAI, but rather instead the escalating price of replacing rare if not impossible
MDS parts on the open market. It is further speculated that perhaps investing in or determining
the feasibility of utilizing 3D printing capability might help militate against year over year rising
costs of depot related maintenance. This arena may be of interest for other researchers to
investigate and to consider further.

50

References

Boito, M., Cook, C. R., & Graser, J. (2009). Contractor logistics support in the U.S. Air Force
(Report No. MG-779-AF). Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

Capaccio, A. (2017, July 10). F-35 program costs jump to $406.5 billion in latest estimate.
Bloomberg. Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-10/f-35program-costs-jump-to-406-billion-in-new-pentagon-estimate. Accessed 20 Aug, 2017.

Defense Standardization Program Office. (2016). Diminishing manufacturing sources and
material shortages (SD-22). Fort Belvoir, VA: Author.

Defense Systems Management College. (1997). Acquisition logistics guide. Fort Belvoir, VA:
Author. Retrieved from www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA368108. Accessed 18 Sep,
2017.

Ferry, G. J. (2013). Cost growth above inflation (CGAI) in operating and support (O&S) costs in
raw materials for Air Force aircraft (Master’s thesis). Retrieved from Defense Technical
Information Center (Accession No. A582469).

Government Accountability Office. (2010). DoD needs better information and guidance to more
effectively manage and reduce operating and support costs of major weapon systems (GAO
Report No. 10-717). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

51

Hildebrandt, G. G., & Sze, M. (1990). An estimation of USAF aircraft operating and support
cost relations (Report No. N-3062-ACQ). Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

Jones, G., White, E., Ryan, E. T., & Ritschel, J. D. (2014). Investigation into the ratio of
operating and support costs to life-cycle costs for DoD weapon systems. Defense
Acquisition Research Journal, 21(1), 442-464.

Mandelbaum, J., & Pallas, S. (2001). Reducing total ownership cost in DoD: Increasing
affordability of DoD systems. Program Manager, 30(4), 76-82.

Mizokami, K. (2017, July 17). The cost of the F-35 is going up again. Popular Mechanic.
Retrieved from: http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/aviation/a27332/f-35-risingcost/. Accessed 17 Aug, 2017.

Office of the Secretary of Defense. (2014). Operating and support cost-estimating guide.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Ronning, D. J. (2017). The use of price indices and cost estimating relationships (CERs) in
forecasting aircraft maintenance costs (Unpublished master’s thesis). Air Force Institute of
Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH.

Ryan, E., Jacques, D., Colombi, J., & Schubert, C. (2012). A proposed methodology to

52

characterize the accuracy of life cycle cost estimates for DoD programs. Procedia
Computer Science, 8, 361-369. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2012.01.073

Ryan, E. T., Jacques, D. R., Ritschel, J. D., & Schubert, C. M. (2013). Characterizing the
accuracy of DoD operating and support cost estimates. Journal of Public Procurement,
13(1), 103-132. https://doi.org/10.1108/JOPP-13-01-2013-B004

53

Table 10. OSD CAPE Cost Element Structures (CES)
CES

1.0

Name
Unit-Level
Manpower

Description
Cost of operators, maintainers, and other support manpower assigned to operating units. May
include military, civilian, and/or contractor manpower.
Cost of unit operating material (e.g., fuel and training material), unit support services, and unit
travel. Excludes material for maintenance and repair.

2.0

Unit Operations
Cost of all system maintenance other than maintenance manpower assigned to operating units.
Consists of organic and contractor maintenance.

3.0

Maintenance
Cost of system support activities that are provided by organizations other than the system’s
operating units.

4.0

Sustaining Support

5.0

Continuing System
Improvements

Cost of system hardware and software modifications.

6.0

Indirect Support

Cost of support activities that provide general services that lack the visibility of actual support to
specific force units or systems. Indirect support is generally provided by centrally managed
activities that provide a wide range of support to multiple systems and associated manpower.
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Table 11. Mainteance CES
CES
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4

Name

CES

Consumable Materials and Repair
Parts
Depot Level Repairables (DLRs)
Intermediate Maintenance
Depot Maintenance
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Name

3.5

Other Maintenance

3.6
3.7
3.8

Interim Contractor Support
Contractor Logistic Support
Other Contractor Support

Table 12. Fixed wing Mission-Design-Series (MDS) included in the study’s analysis,
segregated by organic or Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) maintenance.
MDS
A-10
B-1
B-2
B-52
C-130
C-5
E-3
F-15
F-16
KC-135
T-38
C-12
C-17
C-20
C-21
E-8
F-22
KC-10
T-1
T-6
U-2

Organic / Contractor
Organic
Organic
Organic
Organic
Organic
Organic
Organic
Organic
Organic
Organic
Organic
CLS
CLS
CLS
CLS
CLS
CLS
CLS
CLS
CLS
CLS
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Table 13. Mean percentages of median annual maintenance costs for all organic MDS by
subcategory. Percentages rounded to one decimal place. Total percent does not add to
100% due to taking a mean of medians to remove affect of outliers.
Subcategory
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8

Mean Percent
15.1
42.6
0.0
33.8
0.0
0.0
6.3
0.0
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Table 14. Mean percentages of median annual maintenance costs for all CLS MDS by
subcategory. Percentages rounded to one decimal place. Total percent does not add to
100% due to taking a mean of medians to remove affect of outliers
Subcategory
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8

Mean Percent
1.0
0.9
0.0
0.7
0.0
0.0
96.6
0.0
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Table 15. OLS analysis for maintenance subcategory 3.1. All values rounded to three
significant digits. R2 presented for both log transformed (natural log) and untransformed
variables.
Analysis R2
Transformed: 0.992
Untransformed: 0.929

Variable
Estimate
Intercept
0.0481
Ln (Last Year’s cost): 0.9870
Natural logarithm of
last year’s
standardized cost
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P-value
0.0016
< 0.0001

Table 16. OLS analysis for maintenance subcategory 3.2. All values rounded to three
significant digits. R2 presented for both log transformed (natural log) and untransformed
variables.
Analysis R2
Transformed: 0.980
Untransformed: 0.832

Variable
Estimate
Intercept
0.140
Ln (Last Year’s cost): 0.974
Natural logarithm of
last year’s
standardized cost
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P-value
< 0.0001
< 0.0001

Table 17. OLS analysis for maintenance subcategory 3.4. All values rounded to three
significant digits. R2 presented for both log transformed (natural log) and untransformed
variables.
Analysis R2
Transformed: 0.867
Untransformed: 0.797

Variable
Estimate
Intercept
0.594
Ln (Last Year’s cost): 0.961
Natural logarithm of
last year’s
standardized cost
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P-value
0.2401
< 0.0001

Table 18. OLS analysis for maintenance subcategory 3.7. All values rounded to three
significant digits. R2 presented for both log transformed (natural log) and untransformed
variables. The untransformed R2 is reported with 1 and 2 datapoints removed from the F22 and E-8 respectively for the first few years of reporting. Values were exceedingly high.
Analysis R2
Transformed: 0.956
Untransformed: 0.876

Variable
Estimate
Intercept
0.154
Ln (Last Year’s cost): 0.963
Natural logarithm of
last year’s
standardized cost
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P-value
0.0404
< 0.0001

V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a summary of the research process followed for
this analysis. It also explores some additional variables not originally included in the database.
Sensitivity analysis is performed on the status quo approach used to estimate annual maintenance
cost. This chapter outlines some broad conclusions and recommendations based on the findings
and finally, it presents additional topics that warrant further research.
Additional Variables Considered
The discovery of relatively poor predictive models for the four maintenance cost
subcategories invokes some thought on additional variables not contained in AFTOC or AMREP
that have the potential to improve the models. One such variable is the price of a barrel of oil
adjusted for inflation. This data was gathered from the United States Energy Information
Administration and adjusted for inflation using Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation tables. The
same stepwise regression methodology detailed in Chapter Three is followed with this new
variable included. The variable does not flag as significant when the lagged variable of the
standardized cost is included as a variable. However, when the lagged variable is excluded, the
variable for the price of a barrel of oil does flag as significant along with many other variables.
The adjusted R Squared value of this model is lower than the model built with the lagged
standardized variable and it is not better at predicting the actuals for 2015 and 2016. The full
model output and the validation assessment can be seen in Appendix D. Lastly, the annual
defense budget adjusted for inflation with a base year of 2016 is included as an additional
variable; however, this variable does not flag as significant for any of the maintenance
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subcategories. The annual defense budget values are found in the Office of Management and
Budget’s Table 5.2.
Table 19. Sensitivity Analysis on Predictive Capability of Status Quo on Total Annual
Maintenance Cost (All 21 Airframes, Standardized by Flying Hours)
Percentage

Average % Diff

Avg (abs) % Diff

1.50%
1.60%
1.70%
1.80%
1.90%
2.00%
2.10%
2.20%
2.30%
2.40%
2.50%

0.43%
0.34%
0.24%
0.14%
0.04%
-0.06%
-0.15%
-0.25%
-0.35%
-0.45%
-0.55%

16.58%
16.59%
16.60%
16.61%
16.62%
16.63%
16.65%
16.66%
16.68%
16.69%
16.71%

Sensitivity Analysis
Because thesis’s attempt to build predictive models that more accurately estimates annual
maintenance costs with data available in AFTOC and AMREP was unsuccessful, an
investigation into the status quo is conducted. Sensitivity analysis around the 2% multiplicative
factor is performed for all 21 airframes in this dataset. Additionally, the analysis is performed
for just the airframes that are characterized as organically maintained as there are unknown
outside factors that influence the contracts for CLS airframes. To best capture the total annual
maintenance costs, this sensitivity analysis is performed on 3.0) Maintenance, the rolled-up value
of all the maintenance subcategories. Table 19 shows the mean percent difference and mean
absolute percent difference between the calculated predictive value using each of the percent
multipliers and the actuals from 2015 and 2016. It is interesting to note that the average percent
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difference reaches zero between 1.9% and 2.0%. This indicates that at a top-level of budgeting
and estimating, a multiplicative factor of 2% may be appropriate to estimate total annual
maintenance costs for fixed wing aircrafts. Again, because airframes maintained on contract
have unknown factors outside the scope of this thesis, the same analysis is performed for only
the organic airframes in this dataset. Table 20 indicates that 2% may not be appropriate for just
organic airframes as the mean percent difference reaches zero between 3.2% and 3.3%.
Although it is important to indicate that Tables 19 and 20 are an average of all maintenance
subcategories and that 2% may be an accurate percentage for some of the maintenance
subcategories when assessed individually.
Table 20. Sensitivity Analysis on Predictive Capability of Status Quo on Total Annual
Maintenance Cost (Organic Airframes only, Standardized by Flying Hours)
Percentage

Average % Diff

Avg (abs) % Diff

2.00%
2.10%
2.20%
2.30%
2.40%
2.50%
2.60%
2.70%
2.80%
2.90%
3.00%
3.10%
3.20%
3.30%

1.19%
1.09%
1.00%
0.90%
0.80%
0.71%
0.61%
0.51%
0.42%
0.32%
0.22%
0.12%
0.03%
-0.07%

13.64%
13.64%
13.65%
13.66%
13.67%
13.67%
13.68%
13.69%
13.71%
13.72%
13.73%
13.75%
13.76%
13.78%

Conclusions
The regression models presented in this thesis were not better at predicting annual
maintenance cost than the current estimating method using a 2% multiplicative factor. This does
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not indicate that a CER approach is not appropriate but rather, that more research into additional
variables may prove valuable. AFTOC contains mostly cost data and a few programmatics but it
is limited in detailed maintenance data. The main cost driver in each of the models is the
standardized cost lagged one year. This indicates that a previous years cost instrumental in
determining a future annual maintenance costs. The recommendation from this analysis alone is
not to use the presented models; however, they may provide a foundation to continue to build
and improve.
Future Research
The research presented in this thesis fell short of the goal; however, there is potential for
improvement in the models. An investigation into detailed maintenance systems could provide
additional variables that may be major cost drivers that are not tracked in AFTOC or AMREP. A
comparison of aircraft maintenance performed in the private sector to military aircraft
maintenance may provide insight into maintenance cost estimating or even cost saving
techniques. Lastly, performing this analysis with a bottom-up approach that uses the lowest level
of the cost estimating structure to create predictive models may improve upon the accuracy of
estimates.
Summary
Any approach that challenges the status quo needs to perform at least just as good, if not
better; or it should perform just as good but require less resources. Additionally, it should have
significant research to support a change being worthwhile. Little research in O&S costs have
been accomplished when compared to the tightly controlled acquisitions costs. Within O&S
costs, aircraft maintenance requires a sizeable budget and inaccurate estimates can have large
impacts on the future of Air Force programs. Standardizing cost data and applying regression
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techniques to determine cost drivers from the data available in AFTOC did not result in better
estimates than the status quo provided; however, the potential for improved models is ever
present.
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Appendix A
Percentage Breakdown of LCC by System Type (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2014)
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Appendix B
Summary of Findings from Jones et al. (2014) Literature Review
Source
O&S Portion of LCC
Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Sixth century B.C.
40%
Marco Fiorello, Getting "Real Data for Life-Cycle Costing, 1975
50%
T. W. Otto, Jr., Life Cycle Cost Model, 1975
24.4%
US GAO, O&S Costs of New Weapon System, 1977
42.2%
US GAO, Logistics Planning For The M1 Tank, 1981
70-90%
OSD CAIG, Operating and Support Cost Estimating Guide, 1992
78%, 84%
DSMC, Acquisition Logistics Guide, 1997
60-80%, 72%
IDA, Status of DoD's Capability to Estimate, 1999
Varies by Type
US GAO, Higher Priority Needed for Army O&S, 2000
60-70%
DoD, DoD Weapon System Acquisition Reform, 2009
60-75%
US GAO, Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, 2009
Varies by Type
US GAO, Littoral Combat Ship, 2010
70%
US GAO, Improvements Needed to Enhance Oversight, 2012
70%
USD, ATL, Pentagon Efficiency Initiatives, 2011
70%
Dallosta & Simcik, Designing for Supportability, 2012
65-80%
Taylor & Murphy, OK, We Bought This Thing, 2012
45%, 60-80%
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Appendix C
Exclusion criteria for each model
Model 3.1
•
•
•

•

Exclusion: Airframes that are primarily CLS (10 airframes excluded)
B-2: Any entirely different airframe than the rest… flagged all over the place. Exclude
entirely
Using Cook’s D: B-1 and E-3 spike (under 0.5 but clearly stand out)
o B-1: 6 rows excluded – 29, 30, 33, 35, 36, 38
▪ Lots of fluctuation in raw costs
▪ Draw down of TAI (95-67) over the course of 8 years
▪ Continual decrease in sorties (~6000 to 3000)
▪ In 2007, avg age hits 20
o E-3: 7 rows excluded – 192, 193, 196, 200, 201, 205, 206
▪ Fluctuation in raw costs with little to no change in TAI, flying hours,
sorties
▪ 4 different variants used by USAF
▪ In 1999, avg age hits 20
Total data points: 167

Model 3.2
•
•
•

•

Exclusion: Airframes that are primarily CLS (10 airframes excluded)
B-2: Any entirely different airframe than the rest… flagged all over the place. Exclude
entirely
Using Cook’s D: B-1, B-52, C-5, & E-3 spike (under 0.5 but clearly stand out)
o B-1: 9 rows excluded – 420 to 422, 426, 428, 431, 432, 436
▪ Draw down of TAI (95-67) over the course of 8 years
▪ Continual decrease in sorties (~6000 to 3000)
▪ In 2007, avg age hits 20
o B-52: 3 rows excluded - 458, 459, 472
▪ Large increase in raw cost 96-97… used heavily in gulf war
▪ In 1996, avg age is 35 (Last variant, B-52H, entered service in 1961!)
o C-5: 3 rows excluded – 572 to 574
▪ Large increase in raw cost without change in TAI or flying hours
o E-3: 5 rows excluded – 591, 592, 596, 598, 607
▪ Fluctuation in raw cost and flying hours
▪ 4 different variants used by USAF
▪ In 1999, avg age hits 20
Total data points: 161
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Model 3.4
•
•
•
•

•

Exclusion: Airframes that are primarily CLS (10 airframes excluded)
B-2: Any entirely different airframe than the rest… flagged all over the place. Exclude
entirely
Depot maintenance data only available from ’04-’16… years ’96-’03 (for each airframe)
excluded from analysis… year ’04 excluded due to lag effect
One data points excluded from flagging as an outlier bases on Cook’s D… row 1006 (E3, 2013)
o A few data points stuck out (from the E-3) but still under 0.5
Total data points: 99

Model 3.7
•
•

•

Exclusion: Airframes that are labeled as organic (excludes 11 airframes)
Based on Cook’s D, the following points were excluded:
o C-12: rows 1278-1281 – fluctuation in raw $$ right at about time aircraft hits avg
age 20
o C-20: all rows (1331-1349) – small TAI (~10) leading to fluctuation in stand $$
o E-8: all rows (1407-1425) – airframe phasing in, small TAI, fluctuation in stand
$$
o F-22: rows 1464-1482 – airframe phasing in and hasn’t steadied out
o T-6: rows 1559-1572 – airframe phasing in
o U-2: all rows
Total data points: 89
o Not great results here… probably went through 100+ iterations of
excluding/including data points based on Cook’s D; reality here is that aircraft
maintained on contract are a black box to the AF
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Appendix D
Whole Model (3.1)
Actual by Predicted Plot

Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.981926
0.981817
1.84718
10.36138
167

Analysis of Variance
Source

DF

Model
Error
C. Total

1
165
166

Sum of
Squares
30586.858
562.992
31149.851

Mean Square

F Ratio

30586.9
3.4

8964.297
Prob > F
<.0001*

Lack Of Fit
Source
Lack Of Fit
Pure Error
Total Error

DF
146
19
165

Sum of
Squares
562.37328
0.61920
562.99248

Mean Square

F Ratio

3.85187
0.03259

118.1937
Prob > F
<.0001*
Max RSq
1.0000

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Stand $$ Lag 1

Estimate
0.2433108
0.9979017

Std Error
0.178471
0.01054

t Ratio
1.36
94.68

75

Prob>|t|
0.1746
<.0001*

Residual by Predicted Plot

Overlay Plot Maint Cat=3.1, Organic/Contract=Organic

Studentized Resid

Residuals

Normal(-1e-15,1.84161)
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Fitted Normal
Parameter Estimates
Type
Parameter
Location
μ
Dispersion σ

Estimate
-1.07e-15
1.8416083

Lower 95%
-0.281362
1.6630195

Upper 95%
0.2813616
2.0635067

-2log(Likelihood) = 676.878975944076

Goodness-of-Fit Test
Shapiro-Wilk W Test
W
Prob<W
0.795846
<.0001*
Note: Ho = The data is from the Normal distribution. Small p-values reject Ho.
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Whole Model (3.2)
Effect Summary
Source
Stand $$ Lag 1
Bomber Dummy
Reconnaissance Dummy

LogWorth
106.002
9.009
3.493

PValue
0.00000
0.00000
0.00032

Actual by Predicted Plot

Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.987767
0.987534
7.41888
42.57807
161

Analysis of Variance
Source

DF

Model
Error
C. Total

3
157
160

Sum of
Squares
697774.86
8641.25
706416.11

Mean Square

F Ratio

232592
55

4225.882
Prob > F
<.0001*

Lack Of Fit
Source
Lack Of Fit
Pure Error
Total Error

DF
152
5
157

Sum of
Squares
8639.2337
2.0127
8641.2464

Mean Square

F Ratio

56.8371
0.4025

141.1926
Prob > F
<.0001*
Max RSq
1.0000

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Bomber Dummy
Reconnaissance Dummy
Stand $$ Lag 1

Estimate
1.9025486
17.002148
11.261374
0.8333345

Std Error
0.687794
2.613058
3.061003
0.01464
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t Ratio
2.77
6.51
3.68
56.92

Prob>|t|
0.0064*
<.0001*
0.0003*
<.0001*

VIF
.
2.6198386
2.0343696
3.2967009

Residual by Predicted Plot

Overlay Plot Maint Cat=3.2, Organic/Contract=Organic

Studentized Resid
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Residual Standardized $$ By Maint Cat By Organic/Contract

Normal(-2e-14,7.349)

Fitted Normal
Parameter Estimates
Type
Parameter
Location
μ
Dispersion σ

Estimate
-1.84e-14
7.3489993

Lower 95%
-1.143828
6.6244319

Upper 95%
1.143828
8.2529391

-2log(Likelihood) = 1098.147863541

Goodness-of-Fit Test
Shapiro-Wilk W Test
W
Prob<W
0.838246
<.0001*
Note: Ho = The data is from the Normal distribution. Small p-values reject Ho.
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Whole Model (3.4)
Effect Summary
Source
Stand $$ Lag 1
Total Planned/TAI
Trainer Dummy
Fighter/Attack Dummy
Reconnaissance Dummy

LogWorth
11.259
4.600
3.556
3.066
2.508

PValue
0.00000
0.00003
0.00028
0.00086
0.00310

Actual by Predicted Plot

Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.750171
0.73674
3242648
6475601
99

Analysis of Variance
Source

DF

Model
Error
C. Total

5
93
98

Sum of
Squares
2.9363e+15
9.7787e+14
3.9142e+15

Mean Square

F Ratio

5.873e+14
1.051e+13

55.8510
Prob > F
<.0001*

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Stand $$ Lag 1
Total Planned/TAI
Fighter/Attack Dummy
Reconnaissance Dummy
Trainer Dummy

Estimate
6913091.6
0.57957
-12483067
-3077048
3758083.6
-4929644

Std Error
1157598
0.073375
2814254
893249.8
1237473
1304579
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t Ratio
5.97
7.90
-4.44
-3.44
3.04
-3.78

Prob>|t|
<.0001*
<.0001*
<.0001*
0.0009*
0.0031*
0.0003*

VIF
.
1.8478514
1.1324085
1.5866508
1.1915752
1.4551104

Residual by Predicted Plot

Overlay Plot Cook’s D

Studentized Resid
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Residuals

Normal(-2e-9,3158845)

Fitted Normal
Parameter Estimates
Type
Parameter
Location
μ
Dispersion σ

Estimate
-1.985e-9
3158844.7

Lower 95%
-630020.5
2771773.2

Upper 95%
630020.47
3672565.1

-2log(Likelihood) = 3243.16178050181

Goodness-of-Fit Test
Shapiro-Wilk W Test
W
Prob<W
0.937176
0.0001*
Note: Ho = The data is from the Normal distribution. Small p-values reject Ho.
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Whole Model (3.7)
Actual by Predicted Plot

Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.902272
0.901149
13.96086
46.96629
89

Analysis of Variance
Source

DF

Model
Error
C. Total

1
87
88

Sum of
Squares
156554.10
16956.80
173510.90

Mean Square

F Ratio

156554
195

803.2300
Prob > F
<.0001*

Lack Of Fit
Source

DF

Lack Of Fit
Pure Error
Total Error

86
1
87

Sum of
Squares
16956.795
0.000
16956.795

Mean Square

F Ratio

197.172
0.000

.
Prob > F
.
Max RSq
1.0000

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Stand $$ Lag 1

Estimate
3.9471899
0.9415407

Std Error
2.119895
0.033221

t Ratio
1.86
28.34
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Prob>|t|
0.0660
<.0001*

Residual by Predicted Plot

Overlay Plot Cook’s D

Studentized Residuals
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Residual Standardized $$ By Maint Cat By Organic/Contract

Normal(-0.5928,14.0075)

Fitted Normal
Parameter Estimates
Type
Parameter
Location
μ
Dispersion σ

Estimate
-0.592834
14.00753

Lower 95%
-3.543553
12.208743

Upper 95%
2.3578843
16.43287

-2log(Likelihood) = 721.418978680473

Goodness-of-Fit Test
Shapiro-Wilk W Test
W
Prob<W
0.858572
<.0001*
Note: Ho = The data is from the Normal distribution. Small p-values reject Ho.
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Whole Model (3.1 with Oil Price)
Effect Summary
Source
Fighter/Attack Dummy
REMIS-Landings
Reconnaissance Dummy
Avg Age
Inflation Adjusted (BY16) Crude Oil Price
Secondary RCS
Trainer Dummy
Bomber Dummy

LogWorth
30.372
24.903
20.079
16.462
9.993
6.271
4.167
3.930

PValue
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00007
0.00012

Actual by Predicted Plot

Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.895946
0.891347
5.462456
12.99953
190

Analysis of Variance
Source

DF

Model
Error
C. Total

8
181
189

Sum of
Squares
46502.724
5400.755
51903.478

Mean Square

F Ratio

5812.84
29.84

194.8106
Prob > F
<.0001*

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Inflation Adjusted (BY16) Crude Oil Price
Avg Age
REMIS-Landings
Secondary RCS
Fighter/Attack Dummy
Bomber Dummy
Reconnaissance Dummy
Trainer Dummy

Estimate
30.738214
0.1104366
-0.574734
-7.947e-5
8.0160805
-17.02701
6.855529
18.327994
6.8748606
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Std Error
2.087809
0.016083
0.061504
6.467e-6
1.541678
1.20317
1.741227
1.724726
1.685919

t Ratio
14.72
6.87
-9.34
-12.29
5.20
-14.15
3.94
10.63
4.08

Prob>|t|
<.0001*
<.0001*
<.0001*
<.0001*
<.0001*
<.0001*
0.0001*
<.0001*
<.0001*

VIF
.
1.4972601
2.8847621
2.751103
2.421502
1.9357566
3.088934
1.7047491
1.6288979

Residual by Predicted Plot
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